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 Introduction 
 Most policy designers face complex and intractable challenges that require assembling the most 
appropriate set of policy instruments to address complex policy goals, especially when sometimes 
these goals may emerge out of unforeseen policy problems. In the ideal case of policy design, the 
most suitable instruments can be chosen and assembled into new policy packages that are appro-
priately calibrated and customized to address the new policy problem context. Such exceptional 
design circumstances would also mean that relevant policy actors and organizations engaged in 
the design activity are endowed with the necessary analytical, operational and political policy 
capacities. 
 Not surprisingly, this is seldom the case. Instead, policy designers are constrained not just 
by the context and by their capacities, but are also locked into path-dependent choices made 
through previous layers of policy decisions. However, in situations where governments are faced 
with relatively unprecedented policy challenges or pressing policy innovation needs, they often 
require a new conceptualization of policy elements. To bring more nuance to the process of 
creating novel policy arrangements that are capable of addressing these complex challenges, this 
chapter offers a closer examination of necessary governance capacities for policy design and 
expands upon policy customization as a process of policy design. 
 The chapter proceeds in three parts. First, we examine the literature on policy capacity and 
design in order to establish how the process of effective policy design is a function of how well 
the analytical, operational and political policy capacities on the part of policy designers match 
with those that are required for the function of particular tools and tool mixes. The second part 
of the chapter builds on this conceptualization to distinguish two forms of customization: a pure, 
bespoke design scenario versus more off-the-shelf forms of policy diffusion and adaptation. This 
is followed by the conclusion. The key point of the chapter is to underscore the capacity consid-
erations for ideal design processes and to unpack what is meant by ‘ideal’ design by looking more 
closely at customization as a design process. 
 24 
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 Design Capacities: Matching Tool Needs With Policy Capabilities 
 Studies of the formulation and implementation of policy in general have concluded that success 
in policy design activities rests on the interplay of analytical, managerial and political capacities 
on the part of individual policy actors, regulatory organizations and the general policy sys-
tem ( Wu et al., 2015 ;  Gleeson et al., 2011 ). These policy capacities span a variety of analytical 
resources that are needed to help effectively generate policy. They also include the managerial 
capabilities that let state resources be allocated effectively to different policy priorities and addi-
tionally include political endowments that delineate the policymaking space that policymakers 
and administrators have within which to coordinate, create and implement their policy plans 
( Tiernan and Wanna, 2006 ;  Gleeson et al., 2011 ;  Rotberg, 2014 ;  Howlett and Ramesh, 2016 ). 
 These various resources at different levels of policymaking yield nine distinguishable types of 
overall policy capacity ( Table 24.1 ). 
 At the individual level, analytical capacity entails various substantive skills; managerial capaci-
ties surround effective leadership strategies and political competences are embodied by the indi-
vidual acumen of policymaking actors to assess the needs and interests of different stakeholders. 
For organizations, pertinent analytical skills are centered on information dissemination and the 
creation of an information sharing architecture for the effective transfer of knowledge within 
and across administrative agencies; managerial competences encompass successful coordination 
of resources and stafﬁng between agencies; and political aptitude has to do with gaining political 
support and trust for the agency. At the level of policymaking systems, analytical endowments 
have much to do with the institutions that exist for knowledge generation and use; opera-
tional competences affect overall accountability and transparency; and political capacities directly 
impact public legitimacy and trust. 
 Table 24.1 Dimensions and Levels of Policy Capacity
 Level 
 Dimension 
 Individual Level  Organizational Level  System Level 
 Analytical 
Skills 
 1.  Policy Analytical 
Capacity 
 Knowledge of policy 
 substance and analytical 
 techniques and 
communication skills 
 2.  Organizational 
Information Capacities 
 Information and 
e-services 
 architecture; budgeting 
and human resource 
management systems 
 3.  Knowledge 
System Capacity 
 Institutions and 
opportunities 
 for knowledge generation, 
mobilization and use 
 Operational 
Skills 
 4.  Managerial 
Expertise Capacity 
 Leadership; strategic 
 management; negotiation 
and conﬂ ict resolution 
 5.  Administrative 
Resource Capacity 
 Funding; stafﬁ ng; levels of 
intra-agency and inter-
agency coordination 
 6.  Accountability 
and Responsibility 
System Capacity 
 Rule of law; transparent 
 adjudicative system 
 Political 
Skills 
 7.  Political Acumen 
Capacity 
 Understanding 
of the needs 
 and positions of different 
 stakeholders; judgment 
of political feasibility 
 8.  Organizational 
Political Capacity 
 Politicians’ support 
for the agency; 
 levels of inter-
organizational trust 
and communication 
 9.  Political Economic 
System Capacity 
 Public legitimacy 
and trust; adequate 
ﬁ scal resources 
 Source:  Howlett and Ramesh, 2016 . 
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 These three levels of capacities—analytical, operational and political—have a profound bear-
ing on ﬁnding the best means for achieving a collective policy goal while being cognizant of 
context. Both goals and means exist within a context, which shapes how problems are addressed 
and solutions are selected and applied. Policy aims that are set without consideration of the 
surrounding context and underlying capabilities produce neither suitable design in practice nor 
good understanding in research. 
 Policy design, conceptualized in this way, is about problem solving ( Lasswell, 1971 ). The 
extent to which a design activity solves a problem is a function of two broad characteristics: the 
choice of policy tools or instruments and the capacity of the designing agency. The choice of 
policy tools refers to the instrumental ability of the tool to address the particular challenge, while 
capacity focuses on the requisite capacity endowments of policymakers to use the tool capably 
and to its full potential ( Wu et al., 2015 ). These two characteristics can be examined along the 
same three dimensions presented above (analytical, political and operational), as summarized in 
 Table 24.2 . We will discuss each of the considerations presented in this matrix in turn. 
 Analytical Dimension 
 Instrumentality 
 Policy design is predicated on the assumption that certain preparatory tasks have been completed. 
First, there must be a clear statement on the causes of the problem, based on solid analysis and 
reasoning; it is hard to design without knowing the objectives that policies will be employed to 
achieve. Next, it is necessary to survey and identify the range of tools that may be used to pursue 
the set objective (Bemelmans-Videc et al., 1998; Hood, 2007;  Howlett, 2011 ;  Linder and Peters, 
1989 ; Salamon, 2002). While the basic types of tools are limited, there are almost inﬁnite per-
mutations of each tool and, more signiﬁcantly, various combinations of hybrid tools ( Doremus, 
2003 ;  Kivimaa and Kern, 2016 ;  Howlett et al., 2015 ; Wu and Ramesh, 2014). 
 If solving a problem is the goal, then what goal is pursued depends crucially on the substance 
of the problem being addressed. Ultimately, the measure must eradicate the root cause of the 
problem or at least substantially mitigate its adverse effects. There should be good reasons—
backed by logic and preferably also evidence—to believe that a tool will help solve the problem. 
 Table 24.2 Dimensions and Considerations for Design Effectiveness 
 Dimension  Instrumentality Considerations  Design Capacity Considerations 
 Analytical  Is/are the instrument(s) capable 
of solving the problem? 
 Does the agency know which 
tool to use? Can the agency 
calibrate and use the policy tool? 
 Political  Is the instrument socially 
acceptable/ politically 
viable to use? 
 Does the agency have the 
legitimacy/ ability to reconcile 
political differences or deal 
with political opposition? 
 Operational  Is the instrument 
operationally feasible? 
 Does the agency have 
accountability mechanisms, 
coordination mechanisms 
and a trained bureaucracy? 
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Why will it work? How will it work? To what effect? If it cannot be credibly shown why or how 
a tool will solve the problem, then there is no need for further exploration of the tool. 
 The two tasks described above are denoted as ‘problem deﬁnition’ and ‘policy formulation,’ 
respectively, in the mainstream literature on public policy ( Parsons, 1995 ;  Howlett et al., 2008 ). 
After problems have been deﬁned and solutions scoped, solutions need to be ﬁne-tuned and 
adapted to the imperatives of solving the problem—that is, designed. The design process consists 
of assessing the tool’s appropriateness and adequacy in addressing the deﬁned problem. 
 Policy design should start with efforts to estimate if the tool in question has the potential to 
address the problem being targeted. There are certain innate characteristics of each policy sec-
tor that shape problems in the sector and how they are addressed, and these must be taken into 
account. In the ﬁnancial and health sectors, for example, information asymmetries and unequal 
power relationships are inherent problems, and all attempts at policy design in these areas must 
heed them ( Bali and Ramesh, 2017 ). Negative externalities are innate to the environmental and 
urban transportation sectors, and monopoly is a key characteristic of the water supply sector. 
Most problems in these sectors are somehow rooted in, or at least related to, the respective sectors’ 
innate characteristics. As a result, any policy formulation exercise must take these and any other 
vital characteristics into account. We may call this ‘relevance’ criteria—that is, the design must be 
relevant to the fundamental characteristics of the sector in question. 
 The next issue to address is the extent to which a given tool can be expected to achieve the 
objective being pursued. In other words, what is the potential applicability of a tool to the context 
at hand? If promoting vaccination is the objective, for example, then what tool would best help 
achieve it—a subsidy for providers or users, penalties on recalcitrant families, a public education 
campaign promoting vaccination or merely the establishment of a task force to study the issues 
further? If easy access to alcohol is the main cause of underage drinking, the test would be to 
examine the extent to which a measure will prevent access to alcohol. If lack of textbooks is a 
key cause of children’s weak performance in reading, then the tools must be assessed for their 
potential to deliver the necessary books to the affected children. Social insurance programs based 
on regular contributions are of little use in societies with large informal employment ( Hsiao and 
Shaw, 2007 ). Similarly, regulations are difﬁcult to enforce in countries with weak legal systems 
and widespread corruption. A tool must pass the potential effectiveness test if it is to be consid-
ered further. From a policy perspective, the primary purpose of design is effectiveness, i.e., the 
extent to which an action would help solve public problems. 
 While the potential to get the job done is the primary consideration, policymakers may want 
to simultaneously pursue other objectives, such as efﬁciency and equity ( Weimer and Vining, 
2017 ). Effective at what cost and to whose beneﬁt are legitimate questions to consider while 
assessing the effectiveness of tools. 
 It is always desirable to do more with less, and this approach must be preferred to those meas-
ures that are expensive relative to the beneﬁts they provide. Efﬁciency, however, is not as impor-
tant a criterion as often presented in policy discussions informed by economistic thinking. The 
primary purpose of policymaking is to solve problems, i.e., effectiveness, not to save money, unless 
the main problem being addressed is a budget deﬁcit that the government is trying to reduce. 
More important, some of the most expensive things governments do—defense, education, health 
and social security, for example—cannot be assessed against efﬁciency criteria in either technical 
or allocative senses of the term. 
 Equity is a vital but problematic criterion. To the extent that inequity is an integral part of 
a market economy, there is a limit to how much policymakers can tinker with equity concerns 
without stiﬂing other desired objectives. Yet inequality cannot be ignored, if only because it is 
difﬁcult to ignore it in societies with popular franchise. More important, in some social policy 
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sectors equity is associated with the very essence of the sector, as in social protection, for example, 
where supporting the poor’s income is the main objective. In health care and education, similarly, 
the objective of providing the service to all is essentially an equity issue because it is the poor 
who will be left out without government support. Thus, policies must be chosen not only on 
the basis of their technical and political effectiveness but also the extent to which they promote 
equity while also being efﬁcient. 
 Design Capacity 
 Understanding problems and identifying and selecting tools to address them is a challenging task 
that requires immense analytical skills and resources ( Painter and Pierre, 2004 ;  Parsons, 2004 ). 
It requires an ample number of individuals with domain expertise, analytical and agency-level 
skills. For example, social insurance agencies need a sufﬁcient number of statisticians and actuar-
ies, accountants, fraud detectives and so on, in addition to a range of administrators in charge of 
personnel, public relations and other duties. 
 For technical skills to be used, however, the necessary data and information must be available. 
Thus, the social insurance agency requires a system for collecting, classifying and disseminating 
information and a robust e-governance architecture to connect with the users and providers. 
There are many instances where complex policy tools capable of solving a problem effectively are 
utilized, but they are implemented or managed poorly partly because the agency does not have 
the requisite ability. For instance,  diagnostic related groups , a complex provider payment mechanism 
in health care, must be adjusted continually using data on the prevalence of co-morbidities. How-
ever, most countries that utilize the mechanism do not have the analytical ability to re-calibrate 
payments based on continual big data analysis, thereby leading to poor cost control ( Bali, 2016 ). 
 Easy availability of economic and social data and political support for evidence-based pol-
icy, and availability of skilled consultants, also contribute to the understanding of public prob-
lems and the devising and implementing of policy solutions ( Stoker and Evans, 2016 ). Assessing 
potential technical effectiveness requires analysis of hard and soft data as well as logic ( Howlett 
and Wellstead, 2017 ). If data are available, they are rarely in a form that can answer the question 
deﬁnitively. As a result, practical reasoning is necessary to assess a tool’s usefulness ( Cairney, 2016 ). 
 Political Dimension 
 Instrumentality 
 In addition to the potential effectiveness of a policy in addressing problems, policy formulators 
must also be mindful of the politics of the issue. The political context within which problems 
are deﬁned and solutions are searched, selected and applied is a vital determinant of what policies 
can or cannot achieve (Turnbull, 2017;  Chindarkar et al., 2017 ). Problems are constructed and 
realities shaped by the interests and ideas of different actors maneuvering to deﬁne problems and 
solutions in ways that promote their own interests. All policies create winners and losers. It is 
therefore important that policy options are supported sufﬁciently by potential winners—or at 
least not opposed by potential losers so as to scuttle it. 
 At the minimum, a measure must be acceptable to the powerful segments of the government 
and society. At best, it must raise the government’s popularity and legitimacy with the popula-
tion. For the political policymakers in charge, this is understandably often the most important 
criterion. Whatever we may think of this from a moral perspective, in the real world the needs 
of the political masters are a vital consideration in policy design. Ideally, however, concerned 
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political policymakers would also bear other objectives in mind while pursuing their political 
objectives. 
 Politicians are the most critical actors in the policy process, and so the proposed solutions must 
be acceptable to them. Their primary motivation is to attain and maintain ofﬁce, so the measure 
should, by and large, not undermine their electoral fortunes ( Flora and Heidenheimer, 1981 ; 
 Overbye, 1994 ). The likely response of powerful interest groups (e.g., business and labor unions) 
and media to a policy tool is also important, because their stance affects the decisions made and 
implemented ( Ramesh, 2008 ). 
 Political viability asks whether or to what extent a proposed policy alternative will be accept-
able to relevant powerful groups, decision-makers, legislators, administrators, citizens and others. Is 
the proposed alternative acceptable to policymakers, policy targets, the general public, voters, etc.? 
Is the proposed alternative appropriate to the values of the community, society, the legislature, etc.? 
 Design Capacity 
 The overall political context and the political skills of policy ofﬁcials affect policymaking and 
must therefore be considered in policy design. Particularly important is the lead agency’s public 
engagement resources and skills. Robust public engagement allows agencies not only to better 
understand problems and potential solutions, but also allows them to implement the chosen 
solutions more effectively. The overall level of trust in government affects agencies’ performance 
and needs to be factored into policymaking. Complex reform requires not only that the policy 
tool/instrument used be socially and politically acceptable, but also that the implementing agency 
have the political capacity to reconcile differences amongst stakeholders. 
 Operational Dimension 
 Instrumentality 
 Policy solutions need to work on the ground, not only in abstract—‘in theory’—unlike problems 
in the realms of philosophy, pure mathematics and theoretical economics, wherein solving prob-
lems is largely an intellectual exercise. Practical operational concerns must therefore weigh heavily 
with policy designers. Policy tools that cannot be operated or are difﬁcult to operate need to be 
avoided because they impede implementation. ‘Good policy, poor implementation’ is a common 
explanation for failed policies. A good policy design would anticipate critical implementation 
difﬁculties, address them in the policy itself and reject them if that is found to be too expensive or 
difﬁcult. Vital operational issues that need to be addressed during policy design include: Does a 
tool provide for enforcement of accountability? Does it provide sufﬁcient incentives for improve-
ment? Does it provide sufﬁcient ﬂexibility for re-calibration? Can the tools be employed within 
the planned timeframe? Simplicity of measures (fewer ‘moving parts’) is a virtue. 
 Howlett et al. (2015) and  Howlett and Rayner (2013 ) underscore the importance of policy 
design to reﬂect and respond to contextual features of a particular sector. The policy design has 
to have a certain ‘goodness of ﬁt,’ which ensures that policy instruments and their settings are 
compatible with governance styles as well as the broader political context. Similarly, designers 
are constrained by the ‘degrees of freedom’—the extent to which path-dependent policy and 
program choices made restrict the range of feasible options available to designers. While design-
ers would like to work with unlimited degrees of freedom, in reality incremental changes over 
time caused by recalcitrant layering, patching and stretching reduce the ﬂexibility of designers 
( Howlett et al., 2015 ;  Howlett and Rayner, 2013 ). 
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 The term ‘second-best’ can be used in a generic sense to explain an outcome that is ranked 
less than ideal, but it also has a technical meaning. Under speciﬁc assumptions, in the  Theory of 
the Second Best ,  Lipsey and Lancaster (1956 ) show that removing distortions from a particular 
sector, while letting them continue in a related sector, can be welfare decreasing rather than Pare-
to-improving. Therefore, policy design must be cognizant of the ‘second-best’ principle—that 
perceived welfare-improving interventions can actually distort the allocation of resources further. 
This consideration would require coordination in policy design and ensuring that changes to 
design maximize complementary effects (Gunningham et al., 1998). 
 Policy design must also cater to program-speciﬁc parameters. A useful synthesis of this is availa-
ble in the ‘rules’ of institutional design postulated by  Ostrom (2011 ).  Boundary rules determine who 
is covered by a program and under what conditions;  scope rules list out the activities covered under 
the program;  choice rules list out the various options available to actors;  information rules dictate the 
information available; and  payoff rules deal with issues related to compliance and monitoring. This 
program-level criterion is by no means exhaustive, but it is a good representation of the wide range 
of parameters that will impact outcomes and therefore must be incorporated in policy design. 
 Design Capacity 
 The making and implementing of policies to address problems involves major managerial activi-
ties. Policy managers need skills in leadership, negotiations, conﬂict management and so on. The 
level of skills available in agencies affects the agencies’ ability to make and implement policies and 
must be taken into account while designing policies. More important, the policy process need 
to be backed by a robust management system. Given the complexity of contemporary policy 
problems, public agencies require a system for coordinating the diverse activities that are aimed 
at addressing problems. They also require a system for managing ﬁnances, personnel and per-
formance. The lead agency’s reputation and its linkages with civil society and other government 
agencies additionally affect their policy performance. 
 Customization in Formulation: Distinguishing 
Bespoke and Off-the-Shelf Design 
 Traditional policy formulation studies often thought of design as the wholesale replacement of old 
portfolios to make way for an entirely new package of policy elements. The notion of devising 
customized responses to policy problems has always been prevalent in policy design studies, but 
in the past, this tended to happen without a discussion of the different degrees of customization 
that design processes can follow to accommodate for different contexts and past policy legacies. 
 Two general forms of customization in policymaking have been discussed in the policy stud-
ies literature. First, the systematic arrangement of policy elements, reﬂecting policy planning 
and bespoke policy formulation, was a topic of discussion for early design theorists who took a 
systems approach to policymaking. This approach to policymaking came to be heavily debated 
given the acknowledgment that most policy problems are complex or ‘wicked’ and the formu-
lation of new solutions for such problems cannot take place without situating policy design in 
the relevant context ( Rittel and Webber, 1973 ). In other words, policy optimization for wicked 
problems—or the perfect mapping of policy goals to means—can rarely be achieved in absolute 
terms and can only be feasibly addressed with solutions that are embedded within a particular 
policy context. 
 Another strand of the literature on policy transfer and policy diffusion, relying on models 
of incremental policymaking, conjectured that policymakers dealing with wicked problems can 
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look for decision-making shortcuts or can emulate other states with similar policy situations by 
adopting existing, off-the-shelf policies ( Lindblom, 1965 ;  Walker, 1969 ;  Bennett, 1991 ). Emu-
lation of policies can also help maintain comparative advantages. Welfare policies, for example, 
may be copied by neighboring states in order to avoid immigration ( Berry and Baybeck, 2005 ). 
In other situations, coercive institutional pressures may lead states to adopt best practices from 
other states, and this institutional isomorphism may become a signiﬁcant mechanism to gain 
legitimacy ( DiMaggio and Powell, 1983 ;  Radaelli, 2000 ). For policy scholars researching policy 
adoption as a form of innovation, these strands of literature point to a growing recommendation 
to “de-emphasize the global concept of innovativeness on a wide range of policies and focus 
attention on explaining the propensity of states to adopt speciﬁc policies or programs” ( Berry 
and Berry, 2007 , p. 247). That is, policy design may be characterized by customized or off-the-
shelf policy programs or more micro-level mechanisms rather than the wholesale repackaging or 
adoption of entire policy logics. 
 Both types of customization that look to instill new policy elements—bespoke programs 
and off-the-shelf application of standard mechanisms and best-practices—can occur together 
in several policy contexts. To take the example of environmental policy, scholars have noted the 
conscious choice that governments make between either creating new feedback mechanisms or 
activating more automatic, pre-set mechanisms to deal with the peaks or troughs of economic 
activity that reduce or enhance environmental protection. Similarly, redesigning land use pat-
terns based on evolving environmental criteria can also require a policy rethink on the part of 
jurisdictions that may choose to tailor new policies instead of adapting existing planning models 
( Breheny, 1992 ). This has been articulated by  Button (2002 ) for the patterns found for urban 
development policy design as environmental and economic systems change (p. 229): 
 Feedback mechanisms can take a variety of forms. Some of these require individual, 
case-by-base actions brought about by policy makers and are often in response to general 
movements in the key indicator of some kind . . . these may be seen as ‘bespoke-feed-
backs’. Other feedback mechanisms, however, are automatic. They require no particular 
action on the part of law makers, but rather reﬂect a system reaction to evolving con-
ditions—an ‘off-the-peg’ policy approach. 
 Bespoke design, or the formation of a  de novo policy package, in response to a perceived policy 
problem indicates the highest level of customization in policy design where each policy element in 
the package—be it a mechanism or a policy instrument—can be constructed anew. Understanda-
bly, this heightened degree of customization very rarely takes place. Where bespoke policymaking 
is explored empirically, it is almost always at the level of policy mechanisms or settings. It typi-
cally includes recommendations for creating new elements, which represent the more micro-level 
aspects of policy instrument design ( Rayner and Howlett, 2009 ;  Williams and Nadin, 2012 ,  2014 ). 
 Williams and Nadin (2012 ), for example, call for the creation of bespoke policy measures and not 
off-the shelf instruments, to reduce the barriers in formal industry sectors that disallow the entry 
of present informal, ‘hidden’ entrepreneurship that can enhance economic development. 
 Off-the-shelf policy design represents the more common customization scenario whereby gov-
ernments engage in some degree of non-incremental, novel innovation rather than marginally 
modifying existing policy programs. This reﬂects the main focus of policy innovation scholars, 
who surmise that 
 when people speak of innovation in common parlance, they usually refer to the intro-
duction of something  new . But, when should a government program be termed ‘new?’ 
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The dominant practice in the policy innovation literature is to deﬁne an innovation as 
a program that is new to the government adopting it. 
 ( Berry and Berry, 2007 , p. 223, citing  Walker, 1969 , p. 881) 
 Some scholars also point to the adoption of ‘off-the-shelf ’ policies as a form of ‘fast’ policymak-
ing, as opposed to the comparatively slower process of data collection, analysis and targeted rec-
ommendations for pure evidence-based policymaking (EBPM) ( Stoker and Evans, 2016 ). Such 
solutions are espoused “when politicians are looking for quick, high-impact ﬁxes to the problems 
they are facing” ( Stoker and Evans, 2016 , p. 18). Much of this form of policy adoption echoes 
what has come to be to known as policy  diffusion , whereby state adoptions of policy programs 
are largely emulations of previous programs from other states ( Walker, 1969 ; Berry and Berry, 
1999;  Berry and Berry, 2007 ). 
 Several examples of the distinction between bespoke and off-the-shelf designs appear empir-
ically. In his study on policy innovation for regional economic development in Europe, Jeremy 
 Howells (2005 ) attributes the characteristics of bespoke and off-the-shelf or ‘best practice’ policy 
to ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ policy approaches, respectively.  Howells (2005 ) contends in his 
study that bespoke examples of economic innovation result from processes of packaging or 
‘reformulation’ of individual economic policy, while off-the-shelf policies result from a more 
macro, inter-regional perspective when innovation has to link directly with national interests. As 
the experience with the UK has shown, this distinction can lead to several comparative charac-
teristics, as are presented in  Table 24.3 . 
 Table 24.3 Bespoke vs Off-the-Shelf Design—A Comparison 
 ‘Bespoke’ Policy  ‘Off-the-Shelf’ Policy 
 Advantages 
 •  Developed for the speciﬁ c 
locality and policy context 
 •  Tailored for policy resources 
and available time-frame 
 •  Encourages local coalition-building 
and development of expertise 
 • Can be novel 
 •  Agencies developing the policy 
can gain wider experiences 
through learning-by-doing 
 Advantages 
 • Proven elsewhere 
 • Acknowledged as the ‘best’ 
 •  May have been developed over considerable 
length of time in different circumstances 
 • Ready to use 
 •  May have ‘knowledgeable’ agency willing 
to help, provide advice and support 
 • Not developed by indigenous ‘clique’ that knows best 
 Disadvantages 
 •  At the outset, the policy is unproven, as it is 
unique and has not been applied elsewhere 
 •  May take considerable length of 
time to develop and test 
 •  May aggravate local tensions; local 
resources and expertise may be limited 
 • Generally higher risk 
 •  Agencies developing the policy 
may become inward-looking and 
unwilling to learn from elsewhere 
 Disadvantages 
 •  Common design, may be difﬁ cult to 
adapt to local circumstances 
 •  ‘Best practice’ in what and for whom? 
 •  Locality may not have all prerequisite 
resources, institutions or mechanisms 
 • May take time to adapt 
 •  May be difﬁ cult to understand; may have a large 
tacit element associated with implementation 
 Source:  Howells (2005 ). 
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 Several advantages of bespoke policy design processes are similar to those commonly pur-
ported by proponents of realism and EBPM alike ( Sanderson, 2002 ). Bespoke policy design can 
emerge out of and is tailored to a speciﬁc locality or policy context. Evidence and knowledge 
about the context is gathered through a process of constant trial and error, or ‘learning by doing,’ 
and results are directly applied to the creation of the policy response. As echoed by  Rescher’s 
(1998 ) recommendations for the needs for complexity-espousing assessments for policymaking, 
this form of design fully acknowledges that 
 in situations of unmanageable complexity, practice in matters of public policy is often 
guided more effectively by localized experimental trial-and-error than by the theoriz-
ing resources of an intellectual technology unable to cope with the intricacy of inter-
action feedbacks and unpredictable effects. 
 (p. 189) 
 As a result, bespoke policies that follow this logic of a specialized design can lead to policymakers 
gaining deep insights about the existing policymaking scenario through repeated experimenta-
tion and trial and error. The consequent bespoke policy element would be novel and aligned very 
closely with the policy problem context. 
 As summarized by  Howells (2005 ), many of the challenges for bespoke policymaking are also a 
result of the time-intensive process of perfectly customizing a policy response. While such policy 
elements can be novel and uniquely suited to a policy context, their success in meeting policy 
needs effectively cannot be estimated before implementation. They can be riskier and costlier 
if they require several rounds of experimentation. Agencies engaging in high degrees of policy 
customization may also run the risk of policy myopia, whereby they actively resist any input or 
policy knowledge from elsewhere. 
 In contrast, off-the-shelf best practices that are emulated as-is have the advantage of being 
‘tested’ in various circumstances before they are adopted into any particular policy design con-
text. They represent quicker and more readily usable solutions for policymakers who are on 
the lookout to urgently address a policy issue. Instead of being exclusive and requiring a very 
specialized and contextualized set of expertise, off-the-shelf policies have a larger community 
of knowledgeable experts for support and advice. The disadvantages of such designs, however, 
include the fact that standardized designs may face signiﬁcant challenges while being adapted to 
local contexts that may not have the necessary resources, capacities or institutions in place. As a 
result of any such shortfalls, off-the-shelf policy design may require a long time to become more 
suited to local policy realities. 
 Conclusion 
 Conceptually, a policy design process begins with an assessment of the abilities of different policy 
tools to affect policy outputs and outcomes and the kinds of resources required to allow the tools 
to operate as intended ( Hood, 1986 ;  Salamon, 2001 ). The process is unavoidably contextual in the 
sense that it requires an understanding of how the use of speciﬁc kinds of instruments affects 
target group behavior and compliance with government aims ( Weaver, 2009 ,  2013 , 2010). It thus 
includes knowledge and consideration of many constraints on tool use originating in the limits of 
existing knowledge, prevailing governance structures and other arrangements and behaviors that 
may preclude consideration of certain options and promote others (Howlett, 2009a,  2011 ). It 
requires both analytical and evidentiary capacity on the part of the government as well as the 
intention to exercise such capacity. 
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 Transforming policy intentions into practice is a complex process. It can be effectively under-
taken only by governments that have the requisite technical, organizational and political capacity 
( Wu et al., 2015 ; Howlett and Ramesh, 2016). Many noble policy efforts fail due to lack of capac-
ity in one or more respects on the part of the policymakers. Broadly speaking, it is the relevant 
agencies’ analytical capacity and the government’s political capacity that shape policymakers’ 
ability to set and achieve policy goals ( Wu et al., 2015 ). Policy design is most productive when 
the government enjoys legitimacy and broad political support and has the organizational and ana-
lytical competences to formulate and implement their policy preferences. Agencies’ competences 
allow the members involved in the policy process to identify and understand policy problems, 
canvass for solutions, assess and compare alternatives and evaluate the impacts of chosen policies 
( Howlett, 2009 b;  Howlett, 2015 ). 
 These capacities for design are fundamental for packaging, repackaging or installing off-the-
shelf policy elements in response to a perceived policy problem. The degree to which policy 
solutions are thus customized is strongly linked to the various capacities that are highlighted in 
this chapter. The distinction between bespoke and off-the-shelf policy design closely resembles 
that between custom-made and standard computer software. The main difference lies in the 
latter being designed to be applied across a wide range while the former effectively tailor-ﬁts the 
framework to speciﬁc requirements, a choice most policymakers grapple with in their endeavor 
to pursue purposive policy design. 
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